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Abstract 
In this Thesis, I study the effects of Technological Changes on employment in a 
literature review. I present the features technological changes have and how human 
labor and technology interact in the labor markets. I will answer the question if 
technological changes cause unemployment by studying David Autor and James 
Bessen’s models on worker’s skill acquiring decision within occupations and the 
theory of industry and occupation-specific demand elasticities. The models viewed 
in this Thesis are quite mathematical but they will offer a decent insight on the 
labor force behavior. The theory behind industry and occupation-specific demand 
elasticities is definitely abstract but it manages to explain the main effects of 
occupation and industry-specific matters on technology affected employment. 
Finally, I present an outlook of the effects that the digitalization might have on 
employment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the invention of the wheel, humankind has known the phenomenon called 
Technological Change and through that the definition of ‘technological 
unemployment’ (Woirol, 1996). This indicates the fact that human race has always 
been concerned about the effects of rapidly developing technological changes on 
their employment. The concern has not been any frivolous opinion due to the reality 
that technological changes in manufacturing truly have substituted or eliminated 
certain occupations or tasks previously done by humans. According to Autor (2015), 
the relative share of US workforce employed in agriculture decreased from 41 
percent to 2 percent during the years 1900-2000, due to technological development 
including e.g. automated machinery. In addition, Autor (2015) states that this was 
not the first time technology caused unemployment in the history of humankind. A 
more famous example of unemployment caused by technological change is an 
incident where English textile workers protested new automation machinery in 
their factories due to job losses in the early 19th century. These examples imply that 
the humankind has been at least cautioned towards technological changes related 
to their occupations. Many labor economists have studied the case of technological 
change’s effects on employment (see e.g. Autor, 2003; Bessen, 2015; Brynjolfsson, 
1998; et al.) in the last decades due to the fact that the technology is developing in a 
rapid and exponential pace. 
In this thesis, I answer the question if technological development will cause 
unemployment in the long-term. My purpose is to create a whole ensemble of 
theories, which unites earlier research related to this case in order to produce a 
significant thesis on the effects of technological development on employment and an 
outlook of the upcoming digitalization’s effects on employment. As the most 
significant resources for this thesis I used articles and research that are studied by 
recognized authors and include widely approved theories such as Daron Acemoglu 
and David Autor’s Handbook of labor economics, Chapter 12, Skills, tasks and 
technologies: Implications for employment and earnings, David Autor’s article Why 
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Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation, 
James Bessen’s study papers Automation and Jobs: When Technology Boosts 
Employment and How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, jobs, 
and skills and Erik Brynjolfsson’s & Andrew McAfee’s The Second Machine Age. I 
found it consistent for this thesis to be a literary review because the subjects 
wielded are well studied and with the information produced in the past, I am able to 
combine earlier results into a wholesome thesis. In order to study the case of 
technological unemployment further we need to define what the phenomenon called 
Technological Change means (Chapter 2) and what are its effects on employment 
(Chapter 3). The fourth chapter presents an outlook of the effects of digitalization 
after which in Chapter 5, an overview of the results of the effects caused by 
technological change is presented.  
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2. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Technological development, or change, is “a loose concept that has multiple 
meanings. The concept originates in the 1930s from issues concerning 
unemployment due to technology. It was subsequently applied to the study of 
economic growth, namely productivity” (Godin, 2015). As Godin states, there has 
been a discussion considering technological development and unemployment at 
least since the 1930’s which indicates the fact that human race is, and has been, 
concerned about the effects of rapidly developing technological changes on their 
employment. Although technology is developing rapidly, not all new inventions 
benefit the human society – or in this case, not all inventions are an advantage to 
save labor e.g. Microsoft Office Assistant1. Additionally, technology has its limits 
considering the pace of development. Yet, to accomplish growth, new ideas and new 
ways of working are needed. In this chapter, I focus into the theory behind 
technological change. 
2.1  GROWTH THEORY – WHY DO WE NEED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Productivity is the main reason why more powerful and labor saving technologies 
are created due to economies’ and corporations’ goal to gain more output with the 
same input in order to reach better living standards and profit2. In economics, 
productivity growth is usually measured by labor productivity which practically 
speaking means output per worker. When measuring the productivity in growth 
accounting, the causal Cobb-Douglas production function is primary used: 
𝑌
𝐿
= 𝐴
1
1−∝  (
𝐾
𝑌
)
∝
1−∝
 ℎ. 
                                                          
 
1 Microsoft Office Assistant “Clippy” was a virtual office assistant for computer users. The users experienced it 
useless and annoying leading “Clippy” to be left out from future computers. 
2 Consider the production function Yt = F(Kt, Lt, Ht, At) where F represents the ways of combining factors K, L, H and 
A. Y is the result of these factors combined in a productive way. 
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Y/L stands as the output per worker also referred as labor productivity, A stands as 
the total productivity (level of technology), K/Y corresponds as capital coefficient 
and h as the human capital. The exponent α is the elasticity of total production to 
capital. According to the theory of growth accounting, the capital coefficient K/Y is a 
constant in order to achieve stable growth, meaning that an increase in capital will 
not have an impact to labor productivity in the long-term. The idea behind this 
model comes from a Nobel rewarded economist Robert Solow, who replaced the old 
linear production function with a nonlinear function due to the fact that the linear 
function did not regard declining marginal productivity. The problem with the 
linear function was that it assumed technology to be a constant and the only way for 
gaining growth was by gaining capital. As seen in the equation, when the capital 
coefficient K/Y is a constant, the only way to gain growth is now by increasing 
variables A and h, total productivity and human capital. According to Pohjola 
(2017), three quarters of labor productivity came from total productivity during the 
years 1950-2014 in the US and the corresponding amount in Finland was two thirds 
of the labor productivity. Pohjola’s statement indicates the fact that technological 
development is the main source to gain productivity growth and through that profit 
growth.  
However, as said in the beginning of this chapter, not all new ideas benefit 
economies and corporations or in other words, not all new ideas increase the total 
productivity. According to (2011), the new ideas should meet the criteria of being 
pervasive, improving over time and being able to generate innovations. When the 
new idea or technology meets these criteria, the ideas are called General Purpose 
Technologies (GPTs). According to Gordon (2012), the most remarkable GPTs in the 
economic history are steam engine and electricity since it took approximately 100 
years for these inventions’ full effects to convey to the economy, meaning that these 
ideas improved over time and generated new ideas for one hundred years. Even 
though GPTs are important for economy to grow, inventing one pervasive and 
innovation-generating idea is not a durable solution. The GPTs tend to face a 
7 
 
 
problem related to their versatility due to the fact that although they are 
multipurpose and scientists are able to invent new ways to utilize them, at some 
point the river of new ideas will drain. For instance, before the invention of steam 
engine, productivity had not grown in four centuries. Eventually, the introduction of 
steam engine and electricity boosted the economy to an unprecedented rise. 
However, in the 1970’s the boost started to slow down and productivity growth 
became slower (Gordon, 2012). The season of slow growth continued until 1996, 
when the so-called Third Industrial Revolution emerged and started to heal the 
economy. The third industrial revolution entailed computers, the web and mobile 
phones for instance, but the intriguing thing was that the computers etc. were 
already introduced in the 1970’s. This phenomenon implies that a clear lag 
appeared between the introduction of computers and the boost they gave to the 
economy (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). This feature that GPTs tend to have is 
called Productivity Paradox, meaning that when a new GPT is introduced, it might 
take decades for their full effects to convey to the economy (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 
1998).  
2.2 PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX  
In 1987, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist Steven Roach drew attention for the first 
time to the productivity paradox in his study “America’s Technology Dilemma: A 
Profile of the Information Economy.” In his study, he endeavored to find the reason 
behind slowed down productivity growth in the US since 1973, and his conclusion 
was that even though the amount of computers had substantially increased in 
workplaces, they had very little effect on economic performance (Brynjolfsson & 
Hitt, 1998). Albeit companies were investing on computers, the common belief was 
that they did not contribute to productivity, and on the other hand, the investments 
were also proportionally small compared to other investments such as capital 
equipment (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1998). One of the premier researchers of 
technological change, economist Zvi Grilichies, paid attention to this dilemma and 
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he stated in 1996 that there are systematic biases in the measurement system of 
productivity growth that prevent an accurate assessment. According to Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (1998), traditionally most productivity metrics are oriented around 
counting resources, such as workers and customers and as long as the investments 
in IT, such as computers, allow companies to operate at lower costs, the traditional 
metrics work fine.  
From Grilichies statement, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998) found three underlying 
reasons for poor productivity growth in IT investments. Firstly, the measurement 
metrics should include such things as product quality, customization and other 
intangibles which IT tends to have and in addition, the input metrics should contain 
quality and quantity of capital equipment and materials together with 
organizational capital and training and education of the workers. The third reason 
for poor productivity growth they found was that the organizational structures 
companies have might not endorse the new technology. The conclusion from 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s findings is that even if companies invest in IT, it does not 
increase productivity immediately or not necessarily at all. The organization itself 
needs changes too in order to gain profit from the investments and to avoid the 
biases in the statistics.  
2.3 MAN AGAINST THE MACHINE  
Even though it is important for companies to invest in GPTs such as Information 
Technologies in order to retain competitiveness in the markets, nowadays it 
requires continuous monitoring of technological development. In 1965, co-founder of 
Intel and Fairchild Semiconductor Gordon Moore made a discovery about the pace 
of technological development explaining that the pace of technological change was 
exponential. He noticed that as the transistors Intel used in their computers got 
smaller, the company was able to increase the computing power of computers 
exponentially because more transistors fit into one integrated circuit. In 1975, this 
exponential growth rate of computing power was entitled as Moore’s Law and the 
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computing power was projected to double every two years (Moore, 2006). Although 
Moore’s Law is widely accepted and trusted, there has also been evidence against it. 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) state that Moore’s Law has its limits related to the 
laws of physics, meaning that the amount of how many electrons can travel through 
one integrate circuit per second and how much faster information can travel 
through fiber-optic cable is finite. These statements indicate that Moore’s Law must 
at least slow down at some point, which has already become reality since according 
to The Economist Technology Quarterly (September 5, 2015) Intel has faced 
troubles with doubling computing power every two years. Moore himself also shared 
the insight of Moore’s Law slowing down as he stated in 2015, that the rate of 
progress would reach saturation and he would see “Moore’s Law dying in the next 
decade or so.”3 
Despite the evidence on Moore’s Law slowing down, the exponential pace of 
technological change has been profitable for the economy. This insight is shared by 
Nordhaus (2007), who states that from the year 1850 to 2006, the real costs of labor 
fell by 1.7 trillion-fold because of technological changes. Even though technology is 
changing and the cost of acquiring new technologies is decreasing in a rapid pace, 
human labor is still wanted in the jobs that technological changes cannot handle 
yet, i.e. the jobs that humans have a comparative advantage and are too difficult to 
automate (Levy & Murnane, 2004). 
According to Autor (2015), the jobs that humans have a comparative advantage in 
are the ones that demand e.g. flexibility, judgement and common sense because 
they are the most challenging to automate and we understand these skills tacitly. 
Autor himself refers this dilemma as Polanyi’s paradox, which is simultaneous to 
another technology-related paradox called Moravec’s paradox, which is named after 
Hans Moravec in the 1980s. Moravec (1988) defines the paradox as "it is 
                                                          
 
3 IEEE Spectrum: Special Report: 50 years of Moore’s Law 
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comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult level performance on 
intelligence tests or playing checkers, and difficult or impossible to give them the 
skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility." However, as a 
disadvantage for human workforce, Moravec’s paradox has been partly proven 
wrong since e.g. driverless cars are already a reality4, which indicates that more 
paradox-breaking inventions are coming in the future (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014). For instance, according to Kurzweil (2005), by the year 2020, the computing 
power of a computer will achieve human brain capacity and approximately, by the 
year 2045 it will exceed the brain capacity of whole humankind. Consequently, 
technology might substitute human labor in more skill demanding tasks in the 
future, if the computing power and skills of robots etc. are as high as human brain 
capacity and they succeed to have superior skills compared to humans. Despite the 
evidence against technological paradoxes, the human labor should not be worried 
about unemployment. In the late 19th century, people employed in the farms were 
not worried about machines replacing them because no such thing as tractors 
existed. Since the late 19th century, technology has changed tremendously and yet, 
there is no shortage on jobs. Nevertheless, technological change has its effects on 
employment. Otherwise, the concern that technology substitute for human labor 
would be redundant. 
  
                                                          
 
4 Google’s driverless cars and Sohjoa’s driverless busses.  
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3. THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON EMPLOYMENT 
The supposition is that technological changes substitute for labor – as they intend 
to do (Autor, 2015). During the last decades, we have invented tremendous amounts 
of new technologies to save labor. Yet, in the US, the employment-to-population 
ratio does not seem to reduce (excluding the 2008 financial crisis) which cannot be 
explained by a decrease in the workforce5. This expresses the on-going situation 
that technological development might substitute or even eliminate certain 
occupations, but in the matter of fact, its effects on employment are not that certain. 
Autor (2015) verifies this, as he states that the technological changes have not made 
human labor obsolete and that the unemployment rate fluctuates cyclically without 
an apparent long-run increase. The existing grand question among economists and 
other participants related to this discussion is that does technological change in fact 
cause unemployment? In this chapter, I try to answer this question by analyzing 
the occupation and industry-specific influence on unemployment caused by 
technological change, and by explaining how the technological change is re-forming 
work. 
3.1 THE CHANGE IN LABOR 
In the chapter 2, we learned that technology is changing in an exponential pace and 
new inventions have substituted human labor in the 19th and early 20th century. 
However, evidence against the substituting progress is presented by Acemoglu and 
Autor (2011) who state that the changes in technology are assumed to be ‘skill 
biased’, due to the fact that the new technologies require more skills to utilize them. 
This interaction between demand for skills and technological change was first 
discovered by Jan Tinbergen in 1974 and later studied by Katz and Murphy (1992) 
and many others. Autor and Acemoglu call this interaction as the ‘canonical model’ 
                                                          
 
5 See the Appendix 
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but in other sources, it is widely known as the Skill-Biased Technological Change, 
SBTC. The fundamental supposition in the model is that in the course of time, new 
technologies demand more and more skills to use it and in contrast to the early 20th 
century, these technological changes seems to be complements for skills (Katz & 
Murphy, 1992).  
The effect of technological change benefitting skilled workers was discovered when 
researchers noticed that income inequalities were growing bigger and technology 
was rapidly changing in the same time. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue 
that new technologies often require acquiring and processing information and that 
skills ease this process. Therefore, workers with higher skill level should be 
rewarded with higher salary in the return to their skills. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) also took part to the discussion arguing that educated workers are given a 
competitive advantage when information and monitoring costs within firms are 
decreased by technology, allowing firms to reorganize and workers to perform more 
tasks. The problem with SBTC seems to be that in the 1970’s, fewer people educated 
themselves to college level and the non-educated – high-school graduates in this 
case, had better chances to obtain better wages than nowadays. Due to SBTC, since 
the mid-1960’s more people educated themselves due to increase in demand for 
skilled workers, which led to increased wage rate for educated workers (Figure 1) 
(Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). This change meant that the wages of the workforce 
became more unequal – low skilled workers became inferior compared to high 
skilled workers. 
Like many other models, the SBTC model is not perfect because it recognizes only 
two types of worker levels, high skilled and low skilled. As Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) put it, high skilled workers are college graduates or other tertiary level 
degree graduates and low skilled level workers are high-school graduates. The 
model also assumes that high skilled workers and low skilled workers are able to  
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Figure 1: Detrended changes in college/high-school relative supply and relative 
wages (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011).  
 
perform in similar occupations and tasks, but the only difference between the two 
types is that their ability to perform these tasks is different. To understand the idea 
of increasing wages of high skilled workers better, we can use a generic demand-
supply frame. The relation between high skilled workers’ wage per low skilled 
workers’ wage is on the vertical axis and the employment ratio for the same 
variables is on the horizontal axis. When the SBTC affected demand increases, the 
relation between skilled and unskilled workers’ wages increases correspondingly. 
The demand-supply frame helps us see the interaction between the SBTC affected 
demand shifts and the increase in wage ratio, which ultimately leads to wage 
inequality. 
According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), it is critical to the two worker-type model 
that the high skilled and the low skilled are imperfect substitutes in production. To 
understand how changes in relative supplies affect skill premia, we need to know 
the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers. In Acemoglu 
and Autor’s (2011) model, every worker has his or her own set of skills, meaning 
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that each worker is different. In particular, every low skilled worker 𝑖 ∈ 𝐿 has 𝑙𝑖  
efficiency units of low skilled labor and every high skilled worker 𝑖 ∈ 𝐻 has ℎ𝑖 units 
of high skilled labor, and in addition, the model assumes technology to take a factor-
augmenting form. The factor-augmentation can complement high skilled workers or 
low skilled workers since the both types of workers can perform similar tasks. Due 
to factor-augmenting complementing, the labor markets are vulnerable for skill 
biased demand shifts. All workers supply their efficiency units inelastically and 
thereby, the total supply of both worker types can be presented as: 
𝐿 =  ∫
i∈L
𝑙𝑖  𝑑𝑖   and   H =  ∫
i∈H
ℎ𝑖  𝑑𝑖  
The elasticity of substitution between high and low skill workers is in a central role 
in interpreting the effects of different types of technological changes in the SBTC 
model. The production function for the aggregate economy takes the following 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form 
𝑌 =  [(𝐴𝐿𝐿)
𝜎−1
𝜎  + (𝐴𝐻𝐻)
𝜎−1
𝜎 ]
𝜎
𝜎−1
 , 
 
where 𝐴𝐿and 𝐴𝐻 are factor-augmenting technology terms and 𝜎 ∈ [0, ∞] is the 
elasticity of substitution between high and low skill workers. (Acemoglu and Autor, 
2011) The high and low skill workers are considered as gross substitutes when 𝜎 >
1 and gross complements when 𝜎 < 1. From this model, we can present three key 
situations. Firstly, when there is no substitutability between high and low skilled 
workers and thus the output can be produced only by using these factors in fixed 
portions, the elasticity occurs as zero. Secondly, when the two types of workers are 
perfect substitutes, the elasticity is infinite and thus there is only one skill both 
workers possess in different quantities. The third situation is when the elasticity 
occurs as 1 and the production function inclines to the Cobb-Douglas form, where 
each factor is paid a fixed share of overall income. 
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Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) argued that technological change substitute for 
occupations requiring only routine cognitive and manual task performing skills and 
complement the occupations that include non-routine problem-solving tasks, which 
indicates that the factor-augmenting technological change benefits the high skilled 
workers relatively more than the low skilled workers. From these statements, we 
can deduce that the workforce is changing to a more polarized form. The importance 
of education depends now on the occupation specific matters i.e. the elasticity of 
substitution within occupations and the factor-augmenting form of technology, 
which determine the decision of worker to acquire skills or not. In other words, 
technological change is polarizing the workforce into skilled and unskilled workers, 
which eventually leads to growing wage inequality. 
3.2 GROWING WAGE INEQUALITY 
Bessen (2015) states that technological changes improve the efficiency of high 
skilled labor, leading to larger relative demand for high skilled workers. If we think 
of this interaction in the generic demand-supply frame again, a skill biased demand 
shift increases the skilled/unskilled worker’s wage ratio, meaning that technological 
change increases the wages of skilled workers.  
To understand the phenomenon behind increasing wages for skilled workers, 
Bessen (2015) created a model, which explains the interaction between wage and 
employment. His model follows Acemoglu and Autor’s CES model (2011), where 
every occupation includes a variety of tasks and for each task, 𝑘, each worker 𝑖 
produces 𝐴𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘 of task output per unit of labor time. In the function, 𝐴𝑘 represents 
the state of factor-augmenting technology and 𝑠𝑖
𝑘 measures the skill of the worker at 
task 𝑘. In addition to Acemoglu and Autor’s model, 𝑘 presents also the ability to 
learn occupation-specific skills on the job. Bessen used computers and their effects 
to represent technological changes in the model and found that computer usage 
might lead to wage inequality within occupations. The supposition in this statement 
is that wage inequality can appear, if the worker’s decision to invest in learning new 
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technology varies with worker skills. If the worker decides to invest in learning, 
they will demand a rise in the return for skills i.e. higher wages. Let us assume that 
human capital has a cost, which is paid by either the worker or the firm. The wage 
in the equilibrium for worker 𝑖 in occupation 𝑗 is 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑗𝑠𝑖 and the firm pays 
workers based on their services, meaning that each worker 𝑖 earns 𝑝𝑗𝑎𝑗𝑠𝑖, where 𝑝𝑗 
is the price of an efficiency unit, 𝑎𝑗 is the time it takes worker 𝑖 to produce a bundle 
of tasks and 𝑠𝑖 is the skill level of the worker. The efficiency unit of occupational 
service 𝑗 is 
𝑝𝑗 =
𝑧𝑗
𝑎𝑗
 . 
When there are only two skill levels and technology can heighten productivity from 
𝑎0 to 𝑎1 if worker invests learning cost 𝑐, high skilled workers will invest in learning 
as long as long as the payoff from learning is positive: 
𝑝0𝑎1𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑐 >  𝑝
0𝑎0𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ . 
The high skilled workers will continue to invest in learning until the price falls to 
𝑝1 =
𝑧
𝑎1
+
𝑐
𝑎1𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
 , 
meaning that 
𝑝1𝑎1𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑐 =  𝑧𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ. 
With the new price, the low skilled workers are not willing to invest in learning the 
skills that are needed in the occupation since their payoff would be negative and 
thus they relocate to other occupations. However, if the low skilled workers invested 
in learning, they might stay in the occupation as long as their payoff remains 
positive and they are able to use the old technology in the occupation. As the new 
technology emerges, high and low skilled workers’ relative wage ratio will increase 
due to an increase in productivity of high skilled workers: 
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𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
=
𝑝0𝑎0𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑝0𝑎0𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤
=
𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤
      
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
=
𝑝1𝑎1𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑝1𝑎0𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤
=
𝑎1𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑎0𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤
>
𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤
. 
The results of this model implies that only the skilled workers will now apply to the 
technology affected occupation and low skilled workers are left with other 
occupations in which they still have a comparative advantage over technology (Roy, 
1951). However, as said in the beginning of this chapter, technological changes 
substitute for occupations requiring only routine cognitive and manual task 
performing skills (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003). Consequently, when the low 
skilled workers apply to these routine and manual tasks including occupations, they 
might encounter technological challenges in these occupations too. The following 
chapter will present statements about technological change related to industry and 
occupation-specific matters. 
3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC MATTERS ON 
EMPLOYMENT 
According to Bessen (2017), the US textile and steel industries employed over 300 
and 500 thousands people respectively in 1958. By the year 2011, the numbers 
decreased to 16 and 100 thousand. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) argue that 
technology and changing demand were the primary reasons for the decline. 
Meanwhile, in non-manufacturing industries such as service industries, the change 
in employment rate stayed positive. This can be seen in Figure 2 that presents the 
occupational percent changes in employment from 1979 to 2009. One explanation 
for the differences in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries’ 
employment is that the effect of technological changes is more positive in non-
manufacturing industries (Bessen, 2017). It is important for us to understand the 
factors that determine whether technological changes have a positive or negative 
effect on employment in a certain industry. 
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Figure 2: Percentage change in employment by occupation, 1979-2009 (Autor, 2015). 
  
3.3.1 INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC MATTERS 
According to Bessen (2017), the most pivotal factor in understanding the industry-
specific unemployment caused by technological changes is the product demand of an 
industry. Bessen states that technological changes increase labor productivity 
allowing firms to produce more output with the same input, meaning that the 
supply curve moves to the right. Increased supply lowers the market prices, 
ultimately offsetting the effect of technology that saved labor, if the product demand 
is elastic. After a couple of centuries of rapid productivity growth in manufacturing 
industries, the product demand became relatively satiated and inelastic meaning 
that new improvements in production led to decline in employment. In addition to 
product elasticity, income elasticity also had its effects on employment in 
manufacturing industries. The products of manufacturing industries were already 
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proportionately old and considered as inferior goods. By the 21st century, people 
earned relatively more compared to the 19th and 20th centuries meaning that the 
inferior goods had a very low income elasticity and thus low demand. In contrast, 
the new products of non-manufacturing industries such as services were luxury and 
combined with high initial prices and production improvements the non-
manufacturing industry’s employment grew. 
Bessen’s model gives us a good explanation why the employment reacts differently 
to technological changes in different industries. In new industries, production 
improvements increase employment due to high demand elasticity and high initial 
prices in contrast to old, more mature industries where demand elasticity is low and 
an increase in supply does not have the same affect. Even though the model 
explains the effects of industry-specific matters on employment, it leaves ignorance 
on which occupations within industries are in danger to be substituted by 
technology. 
3.3.2 OCCUPATION-SPECIFIC MATTERS 
To understand which occupations were in danger to be substituted by 
computerization in the US, Frey and Osborne (2013) created a model to explain 
this, which can be seen in Figure 3. They found out that 47% of the employment 
was in high risk of being substituted by computer automation, 19% in medium risk 
and 33% of employment was in low risk category. The results suggests that the 
generality of the occupations included to high-risk category were occupations that 
require only routine and manual task performing skills such as office clerks. 
Surprisingly, most of the people working in sales occupations were also ranked to 
the high-risk category although sales occupations in overall require non-routine 
skills and common sense. The medium-risk category includes occupations that 
require pattern recognition and perception such as bus drivers and construction 
workers. Occupations that are involved with leadership, education, humanities and 
computer science were listed in the low-risk category, which means that these 
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occupations are the hardest to automate. Frey and Osborne’s (2013) results aligns 
to Autor, Levy and Murnane’s (2003) insight that humans will have a comparative 
advantage over technology in the occupations that requires social skills, non-routine 
and common sense, i.e. the occupations that are too hard to be automated yet. 
However, Frey and Osborne’s (2013) study does not commit oneself on which 
occupations can benefit from technological changes. Bessen (2015) states that there 
are at least two reasons why technological changes can increase the demand for a 
certain occupation. Firstly, due to technological changes the firms can operate at 
lower costs, which eventually lowers the market price of products. This results in 
increased demand and thus increased demand for labor. Secondly, because 
technological changes increase the efficiency of labor in an occupation, relatively 
more labor can be demanded from that occupation compared to others.  
Figure 3: The Distribution of Occupational Employment of Total US Employment 
over the Probability of Computerization (Frey & Osborne, 2013). 
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In other words, firms can substitute labor in the automated occupation for labor in 
other occupations. The loss of jobs in one occupation can thus increase employment 
in another occupation within firms. Frey and Osborne’s research gives us 
information on the probability of computerization within occupations in a ceteris 
paribus form. Nonetheless, the reality is that technology is changing and the new 
era of technological changes is transforming the way work is done and merging the 
world in an unprecedented way. 
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4. NEW ERA OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
The earlier chapters in this Thesis have concentrated merely on the effects of 
automatization, robotization and computerization, i.e. the technologies of the past 
and present world. More interesting questions for us are yet to know what the 
future trends of technological changes are and what are their effects on 
employment? One trend of technological changes that society has already observed 
is digitalization. The divergence of digitalization compared to earlier technological 
changes is its non-mechanicality, since automation and computerization needed 
fixed capital to emerge, the inventions of digital era are based more to Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT). 
According to Khan (2016), digitalization is a process where analogical information is 
transformed to numeric and binary form within industries. The process of 
digitalization has enabled e.g. blockchains and Big Data to our utilization, which 
are remarkably different inventions compared to mechanical inventions since they 
do not require new fixed capital to utilize them – instead we may use already 
invented IT capital. Eichhorst (et. al. 2016) describes the new non-mechanical era of 
inventions as “platform economy”, meaning that the suppliers of inventions offer 
their goods and services through a professionally organized internet portal instead 
of selling computers on stores for instance. This phenomenon offers tremendous 
variation of ideas to utilize, since the available services can be reached online with 
smartphones without any barriers (Eichhorst et. al. 2016) and in addition, 
Weitzman (1998) argues that digital technologies provides a massive amount of new 
means to combine ideas into new inventions. For instance, Uber and Helpling6 
utilize the platform technology to offer services locally, challenging the traditional 
taxi and cleaning companies to reform their organizations and adapt the digital 
                                                          
 
6 Uber and Helpling are companies that gather individual service producers and customers under the same online 
platform. The payment transactions are operated by the companies and subtracted by operating costs. 
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service models too. McKinsey&Company’s article7 verifies this phenomenon stating 
that as the economic pressure increases due to digital changes, companies in every 
industry will be affected by digitalization.  
According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), digital technologies meet the criteria 
of General Purpose Technologies, meaning that digitalization could be the new 
boost for the dragging economic growth. A report8, made by a strategy consulting 
firm Strategy& (2013), reveals that digitalization indeed accelerates economic 
growth and alleviates job creation since digitalization increased the global economic 
output by 193 billion dollars and created approximately six million jobs in 2011. 
This might be just the tip of an iceberg of the economic performance digitalization is 
able to provide due to the lag in economic performance that GPTs tend to have. The 
improvement of economic performance surely is not over according to Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014) who state that the improvement is solely being held back by our 
inability to process all the new ideas fast enough. 
4.1 THE EFFECTS OF DIGITALIZATION ON EMPLOYMENT 
According to Eichhorst (et. al. 2016), digitalization is reshaping the forms of 
employment and work into more flexible and complex ensemble. For instance, 
working from home and flexible working times are becoming the standard, meaning 
that the line between career and personal life is becoming more blurred (Eichhorst 
et. al., 2016). The requirement for more flexible labor within firms is wiping out the 
traditional concept of full-time job and increasing the amount of part-time work and 
self-employment. The platform economy is one of the main reasons for the increase 
in part-time working and self-employment because the suppliers of services and the 
customers can easily be put under the same platform for a virtual market, meaning 
                                                          
 
7 McKinsey Quarterly, February 2017. The Case for digital reinvention 
8 Strategy& report April 10, 2013. Digitization for economic growth and job creation: Regional and industry 
perspectives. [Strategy& uses term digitization instead of digitalization.] 
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that the suppliers – or workers in this case can produce services according to their 
abilities. According to Eichhorst (et. all, 2016) the new segment of labor has the 
potential to substitute traditional services in some occupations with wider range of 
services and flexibility. 
The effects of digitalization on employment depend also on the economic level of a 
country. According to Strategy&’s (2013) report, the increase in employment is 
greater in developing countries than in developed countries. The reason behind this 
phenomenon can be explained with the theory of increased productivity. In the 
developed countries, digitalization affected growth in productivity does not create as 
much new jobs than in developing countries since the productivity growth merely 
offsets the technology caused job losses rather than creating more jobs leading labor 
intensive tasks to offshore into developing markets, where labor is cheaper. On the 
contrary, in Strategy&’s (2013) report, the increase in employment in developing 
countries is higher due to three reasons. Firstly, in some countries the digitalization 
gain is higher than in advanced economies. Secondly, the population of a country 
might be very large, meaning that minor improvements in unemployment creates a 
grand number of jobs. Finally, the offshored jobs from developed countries land to 
developing countries increasing the employment. 
As we can see from the statements above, globalization is strongly attached to 
employment and digitalization. During the last decades, decreased communication 
costs have been a primary reason in the creation of a global market for products and 
services (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). With global markets, firms can acquire 
labor with the skills they need from anywhere in the world and in the same time 
the usually low-cost countries can now achieve better wages by applying to work 
e.g. in the United States (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). With the effect of 
digitalization, the idea of global labor markets can be even more drastic because 
digital technology enables working from home, which means that American firms 
can hire e.g. Asian workers to work abroad. Globalization together with 
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digitalization thus creates a competitive and global labor markets with more equal 
earning possibilities for typically low-cost country workers. According to 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), this is good news for overall economic efficiency 
but not for the countries with relatively high wages since now, these countries face 
low-cost competition. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this Thesis, I studied the effects of technological changes on employment. My 
goal was to answer if technological changes cause unemployment in the long-term. 
In all truth, technological changes have effects directly on labor force such as the 
polarization of the labor force and growing wage inequality but occupation and 
industry-specific matters together with worker’s skill level determine the effects of 
the technology to employment. The effects of technological changes depend on these 
factors. It is rather irrelevant to make generalizations of the question if 
technological changes cause unemployment, since the answer is not that uniform.  
Nevertheless, technological changes can cause unemployment if the worker 
possessed low skills and was employed in an industry with mature demand and low 
income elasticity. The long-term unemployment depends on the ability of the 
industry – or economy – to generate compensatory jobs. The general comprehension 
in this Thesis is that technological changes are much skill biased and the workers 
possessing high skills are more likely to benefit from the technological changes than 
the low skilled workers. The workers employed in the product elastic industries are 
more likely to be safe from unemployment since the increased productivity more 
than offsets the effects of technological changes on employment.  
Since digitalization is one form of technological development, it is highly 
presumable that it has the same effects on employment as other technological 
changes. In addition, digitalization transforms the traditional ‘full time job’ work 
into more flexible and complex ensemble as well as it broadens the labor markets to 
a global field with intensified competition within labor force. Digitalization also 
benefits the emerging markets and developing countries more than it benefits the 
developed countries, in the sense of employment. 
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Appendix 
 
Employment-Population Ratio, 16 years and over. 
 
 
Civilian Labor Force, 16 years and over, numbers in thousands. 
 
